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THE BANEFUL EFFECT UPON TAXATION OF
THE SOCIAL LAG AND MISAPPLIED
STARE DECISIS
Alexander Eulenberg
(Edited Summary of a Paper Delivered January 24, 1950 before the
Chicago Chapter of the American Society of Women Accountants)

Justice Frankfurter in Helvering v.
Hallock 309 U. S. 106—1940
“When we move to constitutional ques
tions, uncertainty necessarily increases. A
judge who is asked to construe or interpret
the constitution often rejects the gloss
which his predecessors have put on it. For
the gloss may, in his view, offend the spirit
of the Constitution or do violence to it.
That has been the experience of this gen
eration and of all those that have preceded.
It will likewise be the experience of those
which follow. And so it should be. For it
is the Constitution which we have sworn to
defend, not some predecessor’s interpreta
tion of it. Stare decisis has small place in
constitutional law. The Constitution was
written for all time and all ages. It would
lose its great character and become feeble,
if it were allowed to become encrusted with
narrow, legalistic notions that dominated
the thinking of one generation.”
Justice William O. Douglas: “The
Dissent—A Safeguard of Democ
racy.” Address before the Section
of Judicial Administration of the
American Bar Association, Seattle,
Washington, September 8, 1948

Some Preliminary Definitions:
Social Lag—
The tendency for a society to continue—
whether for physical or emotional reasons
—practices, procedures or patterns of
thought long after logic and experience
have dictated that improved practices are
easier, improved procedures are more pro
ductive or improved patterns of thought
are more valid.
Stare Decisis—
The doctrine or principle that the deci
sions of a court should stand as precedents
for future guidance. The general rule that,
when a point has been settled by a decision,
it becomes a precedent which should be fol
lowed in subsequent cases before the same
court or inferior courts.

Some Preliminary Observations:
“. . . We recognize that stare decisis em
bodies an important social policy. It rep
resents an element of continuity in law,
and is rooted in the psychologic need to
satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare
decisis is a principle of policy and not a me
chanical formula. . . .”
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drawn from farms, factories and schools,
it ordered the production of thousands of
typewriters with Dvorak keyboards. And,
we saw the miracle of unskilled and un
trained young men with no particular ap
titude for typing become fairly expert typ
ists within the space of weeks, not months.
What an opportunity to save hundreds of
hours for the thousands of young women
who will study typing in the years to come!
But that opportunity will never be real
ized because of the insurmountable obstacle
of the social lag. Any young woman who
would now train herself to the Dvorak key
board would exclude herself from employ
ment by the thousands of firms who own
standard keyboard machines. Any em
ployer who might equip his office with
Dvorak keyboard typewriters would ex
clude himself from the opportunity to hire
a typist from among the thousands who
have been trained on the standard key
board.
And so we are inextricably bound to an
archaic system and the loss of millions of
hours of instructional time.

“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds.”
Emerson—Essay on Self Reliance
“With consistency a great soul has sim
ply nothing to do. He may as well concern
himself with his shadow on the wall.”
Ibid
“Inconsistency with past views or con
duct may be but a mark of increasing
knowledge and wisdom.”
Tryon Edwards
“Those who honestly mean to be true con
tradict themselves more rarely than those
who try to be consistent.”
Oliver Wendell Holmes
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty
said in rather a scornful tone, “it means
just what I choose it to mean—neither
more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether
you can make words mean so many different
things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty,
“which is to be master—that’s all.”
Lewis Carroll: “Through the LookGlass.”
“The cause of lightning,” Alice said very
decidedly, for she felt quite certain about
this, “is the thunder—no, no!” she hastily
corrected herself. “I mean the other way.”
“It’s too late to correct it,” said the Red
Queen. “When you’ve once said a thing,
that fixes it, and you must take the con
sequences.”
Ibid

The Problem is Everywhere in the Law—
Not Alone in Taxation:
The social lag manifests itself not only
in matters of the mechanical and physical
but also in patterns of thought.
Today, when a married woman is physi
cally injured through the negligence of
another not only does she have a cause of
action for damages against the negligent
party, but her husband also has a cause
of action for what is known as “loss of con
sortium,” which means loss of her services
as a housekeeper and companion during the
period of her disability.
On the other hand, if a married man Is
injured in a similar situation, he has a
cause of action for his injuries but his wife
has no compensable rights for her loss of
consortium.
In further contrast, in the case of the
injury of a minor, his parents are entitled
to compensation for loss of his earning
power.
This illogical discrimination against a
wife stems from the archaic concept, from
which we have not yet freed ourselves, of
a married woman as the chattel of her hus
band.
Sometimes a great legal mind has the
courage to break through such concepts. In
1915, a man named MacPherson, while
driving a Buick automobile, was injured
when a wheel collapsed and the car over
turned. He sued the Buick Motor Company

The Problem is Universal—Not alone in
the Law:
A profound example of how costly the
social lag can be may be found in the mod
ern typewriter—or what we consider to be
the modern typewriter. The present type
writer keyboard was laid out about seventyfive years ago; and at that time, the ar
rangement of the keyboard was probably
the most efficient that could be achieved.
In the early 1930’s, a California pro
fessor named Dvorak designed an entirely
new typewriter keyboard with a radically
different arrangement of letters. Professor
Dvorak, of course, had the advantage of the
sciences of psychology and pedagogy which
had not been available to his earlier pre
decessors who had pioneered the typewriter
keyboard.
When, at the beginning of World War II,
the United States Navy found itself in ur
gent need of qualified typists whom it could
secure only from its pool of young men
6

was injured he was driving the Buick at a
speed of eight miles per hour.

which defended on the ground that it had
sold the car to the dealer who in turn had
sold it to MacPherson; so that there was
no privity of contract between Buick and
MacPherson and hence no obligation to
him.
Buick’s defence, which received the ap
proval of the dissenting justices of the New
York Court of Appeals was based on the
ancient English case of Winterbottom vs.
Wright (10 Meeson & Welsly 109-1842).
This was an action by a driver of a stage
coach against a contractor who had agreed
with the postmaster to provide and keep
the vehicle in repair for the purpose of
conveying the royal mail over a prescribed
route. The coach broke down and upset,
injuring the driver who sought to recover
against the contractor on account of the
defective construction of the coach. The
Court of Exchequer denied him any right
to recover on the ground that there was
no privity on contract between the parties,
the agreement having been made with the
postmaster agent alone. Lord Abinger,
Chief Baron, said:
“If the plaintiff can sue, every passenger
or even any person passing along the road,
who was injured by the upsetting of a
coach, might bring a similar action. Unless
we confine the operation of such contracts
as this to the parties who enter into them,
the most absurd and outrageous conse
quences, to which I can see no limit, would
ensue.”
The majority of the court, however, held
for MacPherson in an opinion written by
Benjamin Cardozo who was later to be
come a Supreme Court Justice and one of
the most lucid and eloquent, the Court said:
“The presence of a known danger, at
tendant upon a known use, makes vigilance
a duty. We have put aside the notion
that the duty to safeguard life and limb,
when the consequences of negligence may
be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else. We have put the source of
obligation where it ought to be. We have
put its source in the law . . . Precedents
drawn from the days of travel by stage
coach do not fit the conditions of travel to
day. The principle that the danger is im
minent does not change, but the things sub
ject to the principle do change. They are
whatever the needs of life in a developing
civilization require them, to be . . .” (Ital
ics supplied.) MacPherson vs. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382—1916.)
Incidentally, the boldness of the majority
opinion is highlighted by the fact that at
the time the wheel broke and MacPherson

The Problem is in Every Phase of Taxation:
The quest for certainty and assurance in
taxation as well as in other fields, although
it appears to be a quite popular cause at
the moment, is nothing new. It did not
germinate in the administration of Frank
lin Delano Roosevelt nor did it reach fruc
tification in the administration of Harry S.
Truman. One of the earliest modern at
tempts to find a tax whose application and
administration could be fixed and crystal
ized once for all, was made in the latter part
of the 19th century by Henry George, the
author of that famous work on the concept
of the “Single Tax” entitled “Progress and
Poverty.”
For a somewhat more recent illustration
of the yearning for certainty and unchange
ability we may turn to the Congressional
discussion at the time of the establishment
of the Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax
Court of the United States. The Board was
originally set up in 1924 as a temporary
experiment and was made permanent by
the Revenue Act of 1926. There was a
strong sentiment at the time to continue
the Board on a temporary basis for a period
not to exceed ten years.
In view of what has transpired since
1926, the following questions by Congress
man McKeown can cause us only to smile:
“Why extend the term beyond ten years?
Would not the fact that they do render
judicial opinions and settle questions—will
not that settle those questions in ten years
so that there will no longer be any confu
sion? May not the matter settle down to
the point where they will have no work?”
(67 Congressional Record, Pg. 1129-1925.)
In some situations, unfortunately, there
is little if any possibility that either Con
gress or the Tax Court may extricate us
from the involvement of the social lag. A
prime example is found in the seemingly
endless complexity of the double rate struc
ture of the Federal Estate Tax consisting
of a Basic Tax, an Additional Tax, and
various proportional deductions and credits
for gift taxes and state inheritance taxes.
This confusion stems from the Revenue
Act of 1926 at which time certain states,
Florida in particular, imposed no inheri
tance tax upon their residents. As a matter
of fact, Florida had a constitutional pro
hibition against death taxes. In contrast
such states as New York and Wisconsin im
posed comparatively heavy succession taxes.
As a result, Florida was able to offer legal
7

residence on an attractive basis, tax wise,
to wealthy persons who sought to escape
such taxes.
The Revenue Act of 1926 granted a credit
against the Federal Estate Tax (with cer
tain limitations) for such inheritance taxes
imposed upon estates subject to the Federal
tax. Shortly, thereafter, Florida enacted a
tax equal to the credit allowed under the
Federal Estate Tax Act. There was a
further provision that the Florida tax
would lapse at any time that the Federal
Tax credit was repealed.
When, in 1932, Congress decided to raise
substantially the Federal Estate Tax rates,
it became necessary to super-impose upon
the Basic Tax a so-called Additional Tax.
Otherwise, a repeal of the 1926 tax with a
complete and clean-cut revision of rates,
would have effected the repeal of the
Florida tax until such time as the Florida
Legislature might again meet to enact a
State Inheritance Tax to match whatever
exemption a new Federal Estate Tax might
have established. It was conceivable that
in the intervening period, one or more
wealthy Floridians might die, and the State
lose whatever succession tax it might other
wise have collected.
A layman might think that this difficulty
could be resolved if state legislatures would
provide that the state inheritance tax
should be such an amount as would be
equal to whatever credit might be allowed
under subsequently enacted Federal legis
lation ; but here we would run into two Con
stitutional barriers. The first is the prin
ciple that no legislative body may pass laws
binding a succeeding assembly. The second
is that the Congress of the United States
and the State Legislatures are mutually
exclusive and independent bodies; so that
Congress can not legislate for the States.
(In 1938, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,
published “The Theory and Practice of
Modern Taxation,” by William Raymond
Green, who was Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee of the House of Repre
sentatives at the time of early estate tax
legislation and the father of the state in
heritance tax credit against the Federal
estate tax. Chapter XIV of his book sets
out in great—and interesting detail—the
factors which led to the provision for this
credit, the problems that the credit sought
to eliminate or alleviate, and the problems
that it created.)
So here too, analogous to the case of the
Typewriter keyboard, it appears that we
may be permanently chained to a cumber
some and illogical taxing procedure.

Of the hundreds of instances of social
lag and the misapplication of stare decisis,
available space permits my developing but
one further example. In the situation I am
about to describe to you, however, there
is no barrier to a salutory correction other
than the unwillingness of our courts to
change an out-moded and distorted pattern
of thought.
The case of South Tacoma Motor Car Co.
vs. Commissioner, decided by the Tax Court
March 6, 1944, is reported in 3 TC 411. The
taxpayer was a Chevrolet automobile
agency. It sold coupon books for lubrica
tion, inspection and service to its customers.
An automobile owner would pay $10 for a
book of 12 coupons or $5 for a book of 6
coupons. Each time the owner had his car
serviced, the South Tacoma Motor Car Co.
would tear a coupon from his book. When
the books were sold to customers, the pro
ceeds were credited to a liability account.
As the coupons were used, an aliquot por
tion of the sales price of the book was
transferred to income. Quite frequently,
purchasers of books would turn in unused
portions for cash refunds which were made
without question. In the face of these facts,
the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner
in taxing as income, in the year the books
were sold, the entire proceeds from their
sale. As a result, the proceeds from books
sold in 1940, an excess profits tax year,
were taxed to the extent of more than half
of their value; and the taxpayer was per
mitted to deduct as expense the cost of serv
ices rendered in subsequent years when, as
you know, there were no sales of civilian
automobiles, and no income against which
such expense could be applied.
The Tax Court based its judgement upon
Astor Holding Company v. Commissioner
(135 F (2d) 47—1943, CCA-5th) which
held that:
“Where a lease referred to an advance
payment made in the first year of the lease
as “part payment of the tenth year’s rent”
and where the parties intended that the
payment be so applied, the full amount of
the payment was taxable to the lessor in
the year of its receipt.”
Of the many misapplications of stare
decisis, the South Tacoma Motor Car Com
pany was certainly a prime example. But
you should know that Astor Holding Com
pany, itself, was a misapplication of stare
decisis because it was bottomed on three
earlier cases which had nothing to do with
the issue then before the Court of Appeals.
In the Astor case, the Court said:
“Both the taxpayer and the Commis

8

sioner recognizes this to be settled law: An
amount paid to a lessor as rent in advance
is taxable income in the year of its receipt.”
Citing—
U. S. vs. Boston & Providence Rail
road Corp. 37 F (2d) 670—1930
Renwick v. U.S. 87 F (2d) 123—1937
Cow. v. Lyon 97 F (2d) 70—1938
In the Boston and Providence Railroad
case, the issue was whether the lessee’s
obligation to pay the lessor’s debt was in
come when undertaken in 1888, so as to be
a credit to invested capital under the Rev
enue Acts of 1917 and 1918 (Excess Profits
Tax). The Court held that the items in
question were income when paid saying:
“An amount paid in advance as rental
... as to the lessor in computing his tax . . .
is treated as income in the year in which
received.” Citing—
O’Day Investment Co. 13 BTA 1230
—1928
Miller v. Gearin 258 F (2d) 225—
1919
The Renwick, Lyon and O’Day cases re
lated to taxpayer on the cash basis.
In Miller v. Gearin, it was held that:
“The value of a building constructed on
the lessor’s premises in 1907 by a lessee
pursuant to the terms of a lease was not
income to the lessor in 1917 when the lessee
defaulted and the lessor repossessed the
premises. By the terms of the lease, title
to the building rested in the lessor upon
its construction.”
But note that in 1907, there was no in
come tax law. In fact from 1913 through
1915, only the cash basis of accounting was
recognized in income taxation. The 1916
Act permitted, but did not require tax
payers to use the accrual basis even when
it more accurately reflected true income.
The facts in Cyran v. Wardwell were
similar to those in Miller v. Gearin and the
conclusion was the same:
“Plaintiff was the owner of a lot of land
in the city of San Francisco upon which
under the terms of a lease made by plain
tiff in 1908 for a term of 26 years, there
was erected by her tenant a class A steel
and concrete building, the lease providing
that ‘in no event shall the lessee hereunder
have any right to remove any building from
said premises.’ The building was completed
in 1910. In 1916, the tenant defaulting in
accrued rent, the lease was by mutual ar
rangement cancelled and terminated, and
possession of the leased premise sur
rendered to plaintiff.”

The Court held that income was realized
in 1910.
In view of the specific language in the
Revenue Acts since 1918, the decision in
South Tacoma Motor Car Company and a
host of similar cases is difficult if not im
possible to reconcile or justify.
Section 212 (b) of the Revenue Act of
1918 stated:
“net income shall (italics supplied) be
computed upon the basis of the taxpayer’s
annual accounting period ... in accordance
with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such tax
payer.”
The same provision has appeared in every
subsequent Revenue Act and is now em
bodied in the Internal Revenue Code. And
yet, a misconception of stare decisis con
tinues to compel our Courts to ignore basic
accounting principles.

In the ancient kingdom of Phrygia in
Asia Minor there was an ox cart to which
a bow was secured by a knot so complex
that no man had been able to untie it.
Legend had it that a certain peasant,
Gordius by name, used this vehicle, with
oxen, for the labors of his day. Gordius
became king of Phrygia, whereupon he
dedicated his ox cart and yoke to the pagan
god Zeus. According to this legend, also,
there would some day come to Phrygia a
man who would untie this complex knot.
This man would later rule the world. About
three hundreds years before Christ, there
came to Phrygia a young prince, Alexander,
son of King Phillip of Macedon—later to
become king himself, to be known as Alex
ander the Great.
When he learned of the ox cart and yoke
—and the legend concerning them—he went
to the place where the cart and yoke were
enshrined, studied the knot and, lifting his
sword, he smote the knot, cutting it
asunder.
To this day, we describe the “direct ap
proach” which eschews the barriers of tra
dition, convention and inertia, as “cutting
the Gordian knot.”
I am not one who believes that all change
is necessarily progress or that all apparent
progress is necessarily conducive to hap
piness.
But I do feel impelled in these days of
uncertainty and the resultant nostalgia for
“things as they used to be,” to sound a note
of warning against complacency and to
urge you not to be afraid to cut the Gordian
knot.
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